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Abstract
Public criticism of professional media is omnipresent in many democratic societies. This debate has often been examined
concerning what the audience demands from the media (expectations) or how they evaluate media performance (eval-
uations). Based on a representative, quota-based online survey of the German population in 2019, this study examines
citizens’ expectations, evaluations, and the discrepancies between both, as well as their relationship with media trust,
socio-political predispositions—particularly populist attitudes—and individual media use in high-choice media environ-
ments. Results show that citizens have high expectations of the media which they mainly do not see fulfilled and that
expectation–evaluation discrepancies are related to lower media trust in the case of particularly important and/or most
noticeably underperformed media functions. Both expectations and evaluations were associated with populist attitudes,
but only in the case of anti-elite attitudes in such a way that increased expectations collide with negative media evalua-
tions. For anti-outgroup attitudes, instead, the analyses show a generally negative assessment of journalistic media, both
in terms of expectations and evaluations. Media use does only play a minor role.
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1. Introduction
InmanyWestern democracies, some segments of society
have become increasingly disappointed with the perfor-
mance of the establishedmedia. Professional journalistic
media are being criticized for disseminating ‘fake news,’
for being too close to the political and economic elites,
and for reporting in a way that substantially diverges
fromwhat these citizens perceive as reality (Jackob et al.,
2019; Ladd, 2012). These allegations address normative
functions that are expected to be fulfilled by journalis-
tic media in democratic societies, such as providing in-
formation, serving as a watchdog for society, enabling
the constitution of a public forum for the exchange of
ideas, or facilitating civic participation and mobilization
(e.g., Graber, 2003; Schudson, 2008).
Communication research has only recently started to
deal more intensively with the audience perspective on
these normative media functions and to investigate, for
instance, the extent to which citizens’ values are con-
gruent with key normative roles in journalism (e.g., Gil
de Zúñiga & Hinsley, 2013; Peifer, 2018). This research
usually examines what users demand from the media
(expectations) or how they evaluate the media’s actual
performance (evaluations) but has rarely analyzed both
in a comparative way. This leads to the open questions
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of whether negative media evaluations are related to
disappointed expectations, how expectation–evaluation
discrepancies are linked to media trust, and which user
characteristics are associated with specific expectations
and evaluations. The present study aims to address these
questions based on a quota-based online survey, repre-
sentative for Germany, where accusations of the media
as the ‘lying press’ have become increasingly loud in re-
cent years—most of all in the wake of the surge of the
populist party AfD—and have considerably undermined
public trust in professional media among some groups of
society (Fawzi, 2019; Jackob et al., 2019).
2. Normative Media Functions and Media Performance
Since professional journalistic media play a central role
in shaping public discourse in modern democracies, they
are required to meet high normative standards, derived
from their main public service function (Norris, 2000;
Strömbäck, 2005). Depending on the specificities of the
democratic system at hand, the functions of the me-
dia and journalism are given different priorities (e.g.,
Strömbäck, 2005). The most important function of the
media in a democracy is informing the public about what
is going on in politics and society, which relates to nor-
mative demands on the quality of reporting, such as
completeness, balance, or accuracy (Jandura & Friedrich,
2014; McQuail, 1992; Urban & Schweiger, 2014). In close
association with this information function, mass media
are also expected to create a public forum to enable de-
liberation in public discourse by involving all groups in
society and actively mediating between political institu-
tions and citizens. In their watchdog function, the media
are additionally expected to monitor societal elites and
to hold them accountable to legal and moral standards.
The analysis function of the media is supposed to sup-
port citizens in making sense of the complexities of polit-
ical and social developments.
It is expected that journalists provide an interpreta-
tion of current issues and report on suggestions on how
to solve society’s problems (Schudson, 2008; Weaver,
Beam, Brownlee, Voakes, & Wilhoit, 2006). It is also the
media’s task to promote social empathy by creating a
sense of community and ensuring that citizens identify
with the society they live in. The media are thus sup-
posed to make citizens aware of the experiences and in-
terests of other people, especially less privileged groups.
Finally, the mobilization function expects the me-
dia to support politically active and involved citizenship
and to convey democratic norms and values (Schudson,
2008). The media should arouse interest in political is-
sues and show citizens how they can get involved in polit-
ical affairs (Schudson, 2008). These normative functions
of the press are not fixed and the capacity of themedia to
fulfill themhas often been doubted (e.g., Chomsky, 2002;
Graber, 2003). The question remains, however, whether
citizens as the main addressee of journalistic content,
and thus normative ideals related to journalistic media,
share these expectations, and how well they see them
fulfilled (Peifer, 2018).
3. Citizens’ Expectations and Evaluations of Media
Performance
Research examining citizens’ expectations and evalua-
tions of media performance is usually based on journal-
istic role conceptions or quality criteria which again are
usually derived from normative media functions. A re-
cent study by Peifer (2018), for instance, developed
a 15-item scale of perceived news media importance,
which includes both the individual as well as the overall
social importance of six media functions, such as infor-
mation, watchdog, and mobilization (e.g., “provide me
with a daily account of what is happening in the world”
or “provide analysis and interpretation of the com-
plex problems around me”; p. 23). In the Netherlands,
van der Wurff and Schönbach (2014) showed that the
various journalistic role expectations and ideals, such
as the information and watchdog roles, are consistently
expected by citizens (but see for Asian media systems
Guo & Li, 2011; Tandoc & Duffy, 2016). Research in
the US, Sweden, and Israel found that this also holds
for quality criteria such as neutrality, balance, or factu-
ality (Heider, McCombs, & Poindexter, 2005; Karlsson &
Clerwall, 2019; Tsfati, Meyers, & Peri, 2006). The findings
indicate that recipients have similar demands on journal-
ism like other professional stakeholders such as journal-
ists themselves, however, they differ concerning the im-
portance they give to some functions, such as the watch-
dog or mobilizing function (Eberl & Riedl, 2020; Hölig,
Loosen, & Reimer, 2020; Tsfati et al., 2006; van derWurff
& Schönbach, 2014; Vos, Eichholz, & Karaliova, 2019).
Audience perceptions and evaluations of the media
that are analyzed within the framework of quality per-
ceptions either focus on news coverage of specific topics,
such as the refugee crisis (Arlt &Wolling, 2018), the qual-
ity of specific media outlets (e.g., Arnold, 2009), or spe-
cific programs (Heise, Loosen, Reimer, & Schmidt, 2014).
An exception is research on media trust, media credibil-
ity, and media bias that has extensively examined pub-
lic perception of the media in general. This research has
shown that inmany countries, the public does not have a
very favorable perception of journalism (e.g., Ladd, 2012;
Lee, 2010; Newman, Fletcher, Kalogeropoulos, &Nielsen,
2019; Tsfati & Ariely, 2014).
A recent study in Germany shows that users are fairly
satisfied with some media performances but rather dis-
appointed with others (BR, 2016). Themajority (81%) be-
lieve that the media publish topics that are important to
society. For 76%, the media offer orientation in terms
of the relevance of information, and 64% agree that the
media uncover political and social grievances. However,
more respondents believe that themedia support the es-
tablishment instead of controlling it (for other points of
media criticism, see e.g., Karlsson& Clerwall, 2019; Kaun,
2014; Prochazka & Schweiger, 2016).
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Few studies have analyzed citizens’ expectations in
direct comparison to their evaluations of the same di-
mensions. A study by Donsbach, Rentsch, Schielicke, and
Degen (2009) showed that journalists are perceived to
be more intolerant of other opinions and to support so-
cially disadvantaged people less than users would de-
mand. In contrast, journalists are seen to be more likely
to assert their own needs and to have more power and
influence than users would like them to have (pp. 71–73;
see also Karlsson& Clerwall, 2019). Furthermore, studies
have shown that media expectations predict media eval-
uations (Lambe, Caplan, Cai, & Signorielli, 2004; Wolling,
2004) and media evaluations, in turn, are associated
with more general evaluations of media trust (Schielicke,
Mothes, & Donsbach, 2014). The relationship between
expectations, evaluations, and media trust is often dis-
cussed in media trust literature—following a conceptu-
alization of media (dis)trust as a consequence of users’
(disappointed) perceptions of how relevant media func-
tions are met in actual media coverage (e.g., Hanitzsch,
van Dalen, & Steindl, 2018; Müller, 2013). Media per-
formance evaluations are also used to measure me-
dia trust (Kohring & Matthes, 2007). However, the re-
lationship between performance evaluation-expectation
discrepancies and media trust has barely been exam-
ined empirically (but see Prochazka’s [2020] study on
the influence of quality expectations and perceptions
as well as their discrepancies on media trust). Against
this background, our study investigates the following re-
search questions:
RQ1: Which of the six normative media functions
show discrepancies between what citizens demand
from the media and their perceptions of media
performance?
RQ2: How do performance expectation–evaluation
discrepancies relate to overall media trust?
4. What Matters? The Role of Political and
Media-Related Characteristics
Which individual characteristics are linked to how
users evaluate and perceive the media’s role in soci-
ety? Following media trust research that has recently
started to investigate causes and consequences more
profoundly, one can distinguish between socio-political
and media-related characteristics. Beyond sociodemo-
graphic variables such as age, gender, and education
(e.g., Cook & Gronke, 2001; Hopmann, Shehata, &
Strömbäck, 2015; Lee, 2010; Tsfati & Ariely, 2014), re-
search has shown that political ideology (Gunther, 1988;
Ladd, 2012) and political interest (Fawzi, 2019; Tsfati &
Ariely, 2014) is particularly associated with media trust.
More recent studies have shown that what has been
called a “populist worldview” goes hand in hand with
negative attitudes towards the media. Especially anti-
elite attitudes, which are directed against politicians, are
related to distrust in the media and a more negative
and hostile perception of media performance (Fawzi,
2019;Mitchell et al., 2018; Schulz,Wirth, &Müller, 2020).
A reasonmight be that populists tend to perceive theme-
dia as part of the political elite who betray the sovereign
people. This may also explain why exclusionary populist
attitudes (that exclude specific outgroups such as immi-
grants from the ingroup of the people) are negatively as-
sociated with media trust (Fawzi, 2019).
Besides these pre-existing political attitudes, individ-
uals’ media repertoires should also relate to specific user
demands and evaluations. Based on selective exposure
theory, it can be assumed that the media content that is
individually used substantially affects what recipients ex-
pect from themedia and how they evaluate specific infor-
mation or media performance in general (Mothes, 2017;
Tsfati & Peri, 2006). In today’s high-choicemedia environ-
ments, recipients can choose from a vast range of infor-
mation sources, from established mainstream media to
partisan alternativemedia, from political sources to user-
generated content. The latter sources intensively criti-
cize mainstream media’s performance; alternative me-
dia present themselves as opposed to mainstream me-
dia (Holt, Figenschou, & Frischlich, 2019). In this context,
trust research has shown that the use of mainstream
media is positively associated with media trust, while al-
ternative media and social media use can have a nega-
tive impact (Kalogeropoulos, Suiter, Udris, & Eisenegger,
2019; Tsfati & Cappella, 2003). Gil de Zúñiga and Hinsley
(2013), for instance, found that traditional media use
goes hand in hand with a positive perception of media
performance (see also Vos et al., 2019).
Moreover, a theoretical link exists between media
perceptions andmedia-related knowledge as a central di-
mension of media literacy (Livingstone, 2004), as knowl-
edge about media and journalism should enable indi-
viduals to assess media performance more elaborately
(Martens & Hobbs, 2015).. However, research related to
media trust has not produced consistent results in this
respect and found that media literacy can both increase
and decrease media trust (e.g., Ashley, Poepsel, & Willis,
2010; Vraga, Tully, Akin, & Rojas, 2012).
Althoughmedia trust research provides important in-
sights into how media evaluations can be explained, it
remains an open question of how exactly media perfor-
mance expectations, evaluations, and the discrepancy
between both are linked to media trust. We will, there-
fore, refrain from formulating specific hypotheses and,
instead, investigate the following research questions:
Which political (political interest, ideology, and populist
attitudes) and media-related (media repertoire, partisan
selective exposure, and media literacy) characteristics
are associated with recipients’ expectations (RQ3a) and
evaluations (RQ3b) of media performance, as well as
the discrepancy between both (RQ3c)? Do political or
media-related characteristics show higher explanatory
power? (RQ4).
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5. Method
5.1. Sample
A quota-based online survey of the general German pop-
ulation, representative for age, gender, and education,
was conducted in September 2019 via an online access
panel (Dynata). Participants received an incentive in ex-
change for their participation. Overall, 1114 respondents
completed the questionnaire. In the course of data clean-
ing, we excluded those respondents who finished faster
than one-third of the medium time of the whole sample.
This resulted in a final sample of N = 1000 participants.
The respondents were, on average, 50 years (SD = 15)
and 49% were female.
5.2. Measures
Expectations of media performance: Based on normative
media functions and existing research on media perfor-
mance (Peifer, 2018), journalistic role ideals (Hanitzsch,
2011), and journalistic role performance (e.g., Mellado
et al., 2020), we asked respondents what they demand
of the media concerning six functions based on 16 items
(for more details, see Figure 1): information (1 item),
public forum (4 items; Cronbach’s 𝛼 = .81), watchdog
(2 items,𝛼= .78), analysis (3 items,𝛼= .78), social empa-
thy (2 items, 𝛼 = .74), and mobilization (4 items, 𝛼 = .88;
5-point scales from 1 = does not apply at all to 5 = fully
applies). A principal component analysis revealed a one-
factor solution (M = 3.94, SD = .81, Cronbach’s 𝛼 = .95).
However, we decided to also calculate indices for the
six media functions separately, based on their theoreti-
cal classification.
Evaluations of media performance: Respondents
were asked to evaluate their perceptions of actual me-
dia performance by means of the same 16 items: infor-
mation, public forum (Cronbach’s 𝛼 = .86), watchdog
(𝛼= .77), analysis (𝛼= .84), social empathy (𝛼= .80) and
mobilization (𝛼= .88; 5-point scale from 1= does not ap-
54321
…reveal polical abuses and scandals. (watchdog) 0,9 (1,4)4,3 (1,0)
4,0 (1,0)
4,0 (1,1)
4,0 (1,1)
3,9 (1,1)
3,9 (1,1)
3,8 (1,1)
3,8 (1,1)
3,8 (1,1)
3,8 (1,2)
3,7 (1,1)
3,6 (1,1)
2,8 (1,1)
2,9 (1,1)
3,0 (1,1)
3,4 (1,1)
3,1 (1,1)
3,0 (1,1)
3,2 (1,1)
3,2 (1,2)
3,0 (1,1)
3,0 (1,1)
3,1 (1,1)
3,1 (1,1)
3,3 (1,1)
3,2 (1,1)
3,3 (1,2)
2,8 (1,2)
4,1 (1,1)
4,0 (1,1)
4,2 (1,0)
4,2 (1,0)
1,2 (1,5)
1,0 (1,3)
0,8 (1,3)
0,9 (1,4)
1,0 (1,3)
1,2 (1,5)
1,0 (1,5)
0,8 (1,5)
0,7 (1,2)
0,9 (1,4)
0,7 (1,5)
0,4 (1,4)
0,7 (1,3)
0,8 (1,4)
0,8 (1,4)
…inform cizens neutrally and precisely about events in polics
and society. (informaon)
…explain complex issues. (analysis)
…defend the free democrac order in Germany. (mobilizaon)
…impart democrac norms and values. (mobilizaon)
…contribute to a democrac understanding that connects the
enre society. (public forum)
…serve as a mouthpiece for all cizens. (public forum)
… take into account interests of disadvantaged members
of society. (social empathy)
…hold polical and economic elites accountable. (watchdog)
…arouse interest in polical issues. (mobilizaon)
…guide cizens in how they can parcipate in
polical maers. (mobilizaon)
…offer suggesons on how to solve society’s problems. (analysis)
…serve as a mediator between polics and society. (public forum)
…highlight similaries between different polical posions. (analysis)
…give voice to people with different cultural backgrounds, religious views,
and sexual orientaon as well as to people with disabilies. (social empathy)
…contribute to the formaon of cizens’ opinions on polical
maers. (public forum)
Expectaons Evaluaons
Figure 1. Citizens’ expectations and evaluations of media performance in comparison. Notes: Mean values with SD in
parentheses; light grey values represent mean expectation–evaluation discrepancies (SD in parentheses); 862 ≤ n ≤ 941.
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ply at all to 5 = fully applies). Again, a principal compo-
nent analysis revealed a one-factor solution (M = 3.09,
SD = .89, Cronbach’s 𝛼 = .97).
The discrepancy between expectations and eval-
uations was calculated as the individual difference
between both ratings by subtracting evaluations
from expectations.
Media trust: The overall assessment of respondents’
trust in journalistic media was measured by five items
adapted from Kohring andMatthes (2007), measured on
5-point scales (1 = does not apply at all; 5 = fully ap-
plies): “Relevant topics received the necessary attention”
(M= 3.25 , SD= 1.15), “All important information regard-
ing relevant topics is provided” (M = 3.09, SD = 1.13),
“Reporting includes different points of view” (M = 2.90,
SD = 1.14), “The reports recount the facts truthfully”
(M = 2.97, SD = 1.16), and “The journalists’ opinions
are well-founded” (M = 3.07, SD = 1.09). Items were
averaged for an overall index of media trust (M = 3.06,
SD = 1.01, Cronbach’s 𝛼 = .94).
Political predispositions: Political interest was mea-
sured on a 5-point scale (1 = not at all, 5 = very strong).
Respondentswere asked to assess their political ideology
on a left-right scale ranging from 1 = left to 11 = right
(M = 5.88, SD = 2.04). Following the multi-dimensional
understanding of populism, we measured populist at-
titudes in four dimensions with individual items mea-
sured on 5-point scales from 1 = does not apply at
all to 5 = fully applies (for a full list of items and de-
scriptive statistics, see Table 1): Homogeneity of the
people (5 items, Cronbach’s 𝛼 = .75), demand for peo-
ple’s sovereignty (5 items, 𝛼 = .878), anti-elite populism
(8 items, 𝛼 = .8), and anti-outgroup populism (4 items,
𝛼 = .905; Fawzi, 2019; Hameleers, Bos, & de Vreese,
2017; Schulz et al., 2017). We opted to analyze the sub-
dimensions separately, as each represents populist atti-
tudes in a specific way (e. g., “empty populism”: homo-
geneity of the people; Jagers & Walgrave, 2007).
Media use: The individual media repertoire was mea-
sured by asking respondents how often, on average, they
use eleven different media genres for political informa-
tion (1 = never, 5 = daily): public-service broadcasting
(M = 3.97, SD = 1.38); private broadcasting (M = 3.42,
SD = 1.53); national newspapers and news magazines
Table 1. Descriptive overview of populist attitude dimensions.
Dimension M SD
Homogeneity of the people 3.18 0.84
The people in Germany are all pulling together. 2.53 1.21
People in Germany share common cultural values. 3.23 1.08
If one wanted to, one could make policies that are in the interest of all ordinary citizens. 3.62 1.13
Although Germans are very different from each other, when it comes down to it they all think the same. 3.16 1.16
Ordinary people share the same values and interests. 3.40 1.10
Demand for people’s sovereignty 3.90 0.94
The people should have the final say on the most important political issues by voting on them directly 3.92 1.17
in referendums.
The people should be asked whenever important decisions are taken. 3.94 1.16
The people, not the politicians, should make our most important policy decisions. 3.74 1.18
The politicians in parliament need to follow the will of the people. 4.06 1.06
We need a strong head of government who can push through what the people in Germany really want. 3.85 1.20
Anti-elite populism 3.84 0.85
Members of parliament very quickly lose touch with ordinary people. 4.07 1.01
Politicians are corrupt. 3.37 1.22
Politicians make decisions that harm the interests of ordinary people. 3.58 1.13
Politicians care about what people like me think. (reverse coded for index calculation) 2.29 1.21
There is a large gap between the people and politicians. 4.05 1.04
People like me do not have an impact on the government’s decisions. 3.66 1.20
The differences between ordinary people and the ruling elite are much greater than the differences 3.90 1.09
between ordinary people.
Politicians talk too much and act too little. 4.20 1.02
Anti-outgroup populism 3.16 1.25
Immigrants cost our country a lot of money that should rather be invested in our people. 3.31 1.42
Immigrants are responsible for a lot of our nation’s problems. 3.07 1.39
People who are not originally from Germany have no right to receive our social benefits. 3.00 1.42
Muslims and their religion do not fit into our culture. 3.27 1.43
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(M = 2.67, SD = 1.36); local newspapers (M = 3.14,
SD = 1.43); tabloid newspapers (M = 1.96, SD = 1.13);
newspaper websites, news magazines or public-service
broadcasters (M = 3.00, SD = 1.52); tabloid websites or
private broadcasters (M = 1.96, SD = 1.26); user com-
ments on social media sites (M = 2.47, SD = 1.39); social
media channels of influencers, bloggers or public figures
(M = 2.01, SD = 1.31); social media channels of political
actors, groups, or parties (M = 2.08, SD = 1.31); alterna-
tive partisan media (M = 2.07, SD = 1.24).
Partisan selective exposure: In addition to general
media use, the use of congruent media coverage was
measured by four items derived from Tsfati (2016), for
instance, “I avoid exposure to media outlets expressing
views other thanmy own,” “I try to exposemyself only to
media outlets and newsmessages that are in linewithmy
own attitudes.” (1 = do not agree at all, 5 = fully agree;
M = 2.62, SD = .95, Cronbach’s 𝛼 = .82)
Media knowledge: Focusing on media knowledge as
a dimension of media literacy, six statements were pre-
sented to respondents. For each statement, respondents
were asked to indicate whether they think it was true
or false (e.g., “Journalists can report what they want,
there are no legal restrictions.”). If they chose the “don’t
know”-answer, this was considered a wrong answer.
A media knowledge index was calculated from 0 correct
answers to 6 correct answers (M = 3.86, SD = 1.44).
Sociodemographics: Age, gender, education (re-
coded as 0 = lower education, 1 = higher education),
and place of residence (0 = West Germany, 1 = East
Germany) were additionally included in the question-
naire as control variables.
6. Results
When first looking at the descriptive distribution of ex-
pectations and evaluations, results show that users have
high expectations regarding media performance; the
majority of respondents believe that professional jour-
nalistic media should fulfill all six normative functions.
Citizens first and foremost expect themedia to reveal po-
litical abuse, to inform the public objectively, and to ex-
plain the complexity of political issues to their audience.
The majority also wants the media to take an active and
mobilizing role in our democracy by defending the free
democratic order and imparting democratic norms and
values. Furthermore, the media should contribute to the
democratic education of society as a whole and serve as
a mouthpiece for all citizens. Users also expect the me-
dia to represent the interests of the disadvantaged and
give them a voice so they are heard by more privileged
members of society. Slightly less important but still rele-
vant expectations towards the media concern their me-
diating role between politics and society and the analysis
of solutions that are discussed for society’s problems.
Concerning actual media performance, citizens
mainly do not see these expectations fulfilled. A large
part of the respondents is not satisfied with how the me-
dia perform. The discrepancy between expectations and
evaluations (RQ1) varies from 1.2 scale points (neutral
information and mouthpiece for all citizens) to 0.4 scale
points (public opinion formation). There is not a single
function that the media outperform from the recipients’
point of view (see Figure 1).
Going from single items to the six dimensions of
normative media functions, the most pronounced differ-
ences between these dimensions emerge on the level
of user expectations (see Table 2). Particularly high ex-
pectations are found for the most traditional journalistic
principles, that is, the ‘information’ and the ‘watchdog’
function. Least important to respondents—although still
above the scale center—are ‘public forum,’ ‘analysis,’
and ‘social empathy.’ On the evaluation level, differences
between the six normative functions are overall less pro-
nounced. Respondents see all functions less represented
in actual media coverage than expected.
However, all evaluation means range slightly above
the center of the scale, with the ‘watchdog’ and the
‘mobilization’ functions showing the highest values. On
average, evaluations deviate from expectations by one
scale point, with merely small differences between indi-
vidual dimensions. Only the ‘information’ function some-
what stands out with the largest discrepancy. However,
in the case of ‘information,’ only one item represents the
Table 2. Repeated-measures ANOVAs on differences in mean expectations, evaluations, and evaluation-expectation dis-
crepancies for the six dimensions of normative media functions (SD in parentheses).
Expectation Evaluation Expectation–Evaluation Discrepancy
Information 4.26 (1.00)a 3.06 (1.15)a 1.22 (1.47)a
Public forum 3.89 (0.87)b 3.04 (0.95)a 0.85 (1.09)b
Watchdog 4.09 (0.95)c 3.25 (1.01)b 0.85 (1.27)b
Analysis 3.86 (0.88)b 3.01 (0.95)a 0.87 (1.12)b
Social empathy 3.89 (0.96)b 3.04 (1.03)a 0.87 (1.31)b
Mobilization 3.95 (0.92)d 3.15 (0.96)c 0.81 (1.07)b
Test statistics F(5, 4635) = 85.86, p < .001, F(5, 4370) = 28.79, p < .001, F(5, 4295) = 35.62, p < .001,
𝜂2 = .085 𝜂2 = .032 𝜂2 = .040
Notes: 860 ≤ n ≤ 928; Means with different superscripts per construct differed significantly at p < .05 in repeated-measures ANOVAs
with Bonferroni correction. *** p < .001.
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whole dimension, while larger discrepancies in individ-
ual items of other dimensions are less reflected due to
the index they are part of. This particularly applies to the
‘public forum’-item “serving as a mouthpiece for all cit-
izens” (see Figure 1) and, thus, an item that in a sense
reflects the counterpart of ‘information’ by represent-
ing the news flow from the citizen rather than towards
the citizen.
How do these discrepancies translate into more gen-
eral evaluations of the media as institutions that can
be trusted (RQ2)? The results of the linear regression
analysis in Table 3 show that media trust is significantly
related to four of the six dimensions of expectation–
evaluation discrepancies. Specifically, higher discrepan-
cies are linked to lower scores on media trust for the
normative media functions of ‘information,’ ‘public fo-
rum,’ and ‘watchdog’—hence, the three dimensions that
are particularly important to users and/or most notice-
ably underperformed. Users are thus more skeptic of
journalistic media if they expect the media to adhere to
their main public service functions of reporting news in
a neutral and precise way (information), of supporting
public discourse by mediating between politics and soci-
ety (public forum), and of monitoring what powerful ac-
tors in society do (watchdog), but do not see these ex-
pectations properly met in actual media coverage. The
same pattern does not emerge with regards to ‘analy-
sis’ and ‘mobilization’ functions. In these cases, respon-
dents show similar levels of media trust, regardless of
how large the discrepancies are between their expecta-
tions for themedia to provide comprehensive analysis on
complex issues (analysis) and to support political partic-
ipation (mobilization) and respondents’ perceptions of
how well these standards are fulfilled. Lastly, ‘social em-
pathy’ presents a special case in that a higher discrep-
ancy on this dimension is associated with higher instead
of lower media trust—a surprising finding that may indi-
cate a certain level of social desirability among respon-
dents when assessing the related items in terms of their
individual relevance.
Expectations and evaluations are further linked to
both socio-political and media-related characteristics
(RQ3a, RQ3b). In terms of citizens’ expectations, age
shows a positive relationship, as does political interest
(see Table 4). Moreover, the more respondents place
themselves on the left side of the political ideology scale,
the higher their expectations of media performance.
Furthermore, all dimensions of populist ideology play a
role in citizens’ evaluation of the media, but not in a con-
sistent way: Individuals who perceive the people to be
a homogenous group have higher expectations and also
evaluate media performance more positively. Demand
for people’s sovereignty goes hand in hand with higher
expectations but is not associated with performance
evaluations. Anti-elite populist attitudes also come along
with higher demands of media performance, but with a
more negative perception of actual media performance.
For those individuals, increased expectations collidewith
negative media perceptions. For anti-outgroup attitudes,
in contrast, the analyses show a generally negative as-
sessment of professional journalistic media, as they have
both lower expectations and more negative perceptions.
The expectation–evaluation discrepancy is higher for in-
dividuals with lower political interest and with a more
right-wing ideology (RQ3c). While homogeneity percep-
tions regarding the people are related to lower discrep-
ancies, individuals with higher scores on the two populist
dimensions ‘demand for sovereignty’ and ‘anti-elite pop-
ulism’ show larger discrepancies between their expecta-
tions and perceived media performance.
In comparison to political predispositions, recipients’
media use and literacy only play a marginal role with less
Table 3. Linear regression model of the relationship between expectation–evaluation discrepancies and media trust.
b SE 𝛽 p
Constant 3.182 .148
Sociodemographics
Gender .082 .061 .041 .178
Age .004 .002 .059 .052
Education .036 .062 .017 .563
Place of residence −.110 .083 −.038 .186
Δ Adj. R2 .002
Expectation–evaluation discrepancies
Information −.261 .029 −.379 < .001
Public forum −.119 .051 −.128 .020
Watchdog −.085 .037 −.106 .021
Analysis −.060 .047 −.067 .203
Social empathy .082 .031 .106 .008
Mobilization .005 .049 .005 .920
Δ Adj. R2 .291***
Adj. R2 .293***
Notes: n = 855; VIF < 3.7, Durbin-Watson = 2.01. *** p < .001.
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Table 4. Explaining citizens’ expectations, evaluations, and expectation–evaluation discrepancies of media performance.
Expectation–evaluation
Expectations Evaluations discrepancy
Constant 1.966*** 2.536*** −.564
Sociodemographics
Gender −.098 −.103 .019
Age .008*** .003 .004
Education −.037 −.043 .005
Place of residence −.080 −.206* .131
Δ Adj. R2 .062 .010 .020
Political characteristics
Political interest .153*** .048 .109**
Political ideology −.044*** −.009 −.037**
Homogeneity of the people .110*** .209*** −.109**
Demand for Sovereignty .186*** −.002 .198***
Anti-Elite populism .101** −.255*** .352***
Anti-outgroup populism −.075** −.089** .005
Δ Adj. R2 .191 .155 .186
Media-related characteristics
Public-service broadcasting .036 .092*** −.050
National newspapers and news magazines −.013 .041 .054
Local newspapers .049* .038 .010
Newspaper websites, news magazines or PSB .054** .021 .028
Private broadcasting .002 .034 −.028
Tabloid newspapers −.050 .035 −.088**
Tabloid websites or private broadcasters −.036 .016 −.051
Online user comments −.003 −.091*** .086**
Social media channels of influencers, bloggers, or public figures .063* .044 .017
Social media channels of political actors, groups or parties .015 .015 .002
Alternative partisan media −.015 −.030 .016
Partisan selective exposure −.053 .119*** −.161***
Media knowledge .022 .026 −.007
Δ Adj. R2 .024 .071 .047
Adj. R2 .277*** .236*** .253***
Notes: Unstandardized b-values. 773 ≤ n ≤ 785; VIF < 2.6, Durbin-Watson-test: 1.92–2.06. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
explanatory power (RQ4). However, results show that
the information sources recipients use in a high-choice
media environment matter for users’ evaluation of pro-
fessional journalistic media. The use of legacy media out-
lets, local newspapers, and onlinewebsites of qualityme-
dia is related to higher expectations, while public-service
broadcasting use is associated with better evaluations
of media performance. Those who receive news from
sources such as influencers or bloggers also have higher
expectations of journalistic media. In contrast, reading
online user comments is associated with more nega-
tive evaluations of media performance. Finally, exposure
to congruent media content is not related to expecta-
tions but comes along withmore positive views of media
performance. Media knowledge does not play a role in
explaining both expectations and evaluations. In terms
of expectation–evaluation discrepancies, tabloid media
use and partisan selective exposure are associated with
smaller discrepancies, while heavy use of user comments
is related to larger discrepancies (for information on pre-
dictors of individual expectation–evaluation discrepan-
cies for each of the six dimensions of normative media
functions, see Supplementary File).
In the next step, we were interested in the extent
to which expectations and evaluations differ at the level
of the six individual dimensions of media functions. We
will particularly focus on the impact of political predis-
positions due to their significant importance in shaping
user demands and perceptions. After controlling for so-
ciodemographic variables, the results show that political
interest is positively linked to both expectations and eval-
uations across all six media functions. For political ideol-
ogy, we findmixed results. Left-wing orientation is consis-
tently associatedwith higher expectations, but the evalu-
ation of the public forum, analysis, andmobilization func-
tions is independent of political ideology.
Concerning populist attitudes, homogeneity percep-
tions consistently go along with higher expectations (ex-
cept for the information function) and more positive
evaluations. The more users claim people’s sovereignty,
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the higher their expectations of all six media functions.
Media performance evaluations, in contrast, are not
linked to this populist dimension. In terms of anti-elite
populism, results show that higher expectations of in-
dividuals supporting anti-elite ideas are only due to
higher expectations regarding the media’s information
andwatchdog functions. Yet, negative perceptions ofme-
dia performance by anti-elitist recipients are directed at
all six media functions. In contrast, the overall negative
evaluation of the media’s role in society by citizens with
exclusionary populist attitudes can be traced back to all
media functions except the watchdog role (see Table 5).
7. Discussion
In today’s media environments, professional journalistic
news media compete with a vast number of alternative
information sources for the attention of the audience.
At the same time, journalistic news media face funda-
mental public criticism, especially voiced by populists.
Against this background, the present study had two aims:
first, to determine the extent to which civic demands of
the media collide with their perceptions of actual media
performance, and how this discrepancy is linked to over-
all media trust; and second, to determine to which ex-
tent socio-political predispositions andmedia-related be-
haviors are linked to citizens’ expectations, evaluations,
and expectation–evaluation discrepancies in terms of six
media functions: information, public forum, watchdog,
analysis, social empathy, and mobilization.
Our study provides systematic insights into how
German citizens’ expectations regarding normative me-
dia functions collide with their evaluations, and how
these discrepancies are related to overall media trust.
Our findings show that the public has high expectations
of the media which they do not see completely ful-
filled, and that resulting expectation–evaluation discrep-
ancies are associated with lower levels of media trust,
if normative functions are addressed that are of partic-
ular relevance to the users and/or perceived as particu-
larly underperformed.
Our study additionally extends earlier research by
showing that both expectations and evaluations are
linked to populist attitudes. However, increased expec-
tations collided with negative media evaluations only in
the case of anti-elite attitudes. For anti-outgroup atti-
tudes, in contrast, the analyses show a generally nega-
tive assessment of professional journalistic media, both
in terms of expectations and evaluations. This finding
confirms the mismatch between this particular populist
dimension, representing the anti-pluralistic character of
populism, and the normative expectations towards the
media in pluralistic societies.
In line with previous research, our study also shows
that media expectations and evaluations are strongly re-
lated to pre-existing political attitudes. Interestingly, they
matter much more than the actual media repertoire.
Whether recipients get their news primarily from public-
service broadcasters, partisan media or other sources
has little impact on how they perceive media perfor-
mance. Future media trust research should, therefore,
add political predispositions more systematically to the
equation, in addition to media use as a central concept
related to media trust in extant research. Noteworthy,
however, is the negative association between the use
of online user comments and performance evaluations.
This might be due to a dominant representation of dissat-
isfied users who take advantage of commenting options
to publicly criticize established media (e.g., Craft, Vos, &
Wolfgang, 2016; Prochazka & Schweiger, 2016).
These results have important implications. The fact
that a large part of users does not perceive professional
journalistic media to fulfill their normative functions,
could lead to a further polarization of society. In partic-
ular, those recipients who regard politicians as the divi-
sive and malicious elite are also the ones who are dis-
appointed by the media and, hence, do not feel repre-
sented by them. Why should they use these media out-
lets for political news, why should they be willing to pay
for their content? They will rather turn to more partisan
outlets that are in line with their populist worldviews or
avoid political news altogether.
Several limitations of this study need to be acknowl-
edged. Our classification of independent and depen-
dent variables is based on theoretical arguments. We as-
sessed political predispositions, media use, and media
knowledge as independent variables. In reality, how-
ever, they might also be affected by media percep-
tions. This reciprocal relationship cannot be addressed
by cross-sectional data and calls for longitudinal designs.
Moreover, measuring discrepancies between expecta-
tions and evaluations comeswith some challenges.Most
of all, asking individuals to indicate their expectations
may negatively affect their performance evaluations
(e.g., Park & Yi, 2016). This is particularly likely when
the evaluation dimensions are of high normative rele-
vance and the attitude object is rather vague (Daniller,
Allen, Tallevi, & Mutz, 2017; Webster & Entwisle, 1976),
as is the case with basically desirable journalistic quality
dimensions in general reference to ‘journalistic media.’
Hence, future studies should consider including a greater
variety of normatively desirable and undesirable evalua-
tion dimensions to assess the performance of more spe-
cific journalistic media outlets.
Overall, however, we hope that our study can shed
some light on how user expectations and evaluations
of media performance relate to more general percep-
tions of media trust in the broader context of a politically
charged high-choicemedia environmentwhere journalis-
tic media may find themselves in a growing predicament:
Being seen as part of the ‘enemy’ by a substantial part of
society, journalistic media may gradually lose their abil-
ity to contribute to social synchronization and to repre-
sent all groups of society, which is—from a public service
point of view—at the heart of what professional media
should aim for in democratic societies.
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Table 5. Explaining citizens’ expectations and evaluations of six normative media functions.
Information Public forum Watchdog Analysis Social empathy Mobilization
Expectation Evaluation Expectation Evaluation Expectation Evaluation Expectation Evaluation Expectation Evaluation Expectation Evaluation
Constant 2.194*** 3.654*** 2.022*** 3.046*** 1.622*** 3.311*** 2.133*** 3.300*** 2.849*** 2.514*** 1.931*** 3.188***
Gender −.143 −.128 −.095 −.126 .003 −.115 −.115 −.049 −.115 −.033 −.064 −0.054
Age .011*** .005 .008*** .004 .011*** .01*** .007 .003 .006** .004 .011*** .006**
Education .184** .051 .007 .050 .039 .056 −.035 .016 −.085 .096 .060 −.001
Place of −.054 −.186 −.102 −.241* −.101 −.205* −.101 −.217* −.105 −.188 −.093 −.217**
residence
Δ Adj. R2 .061 .002 .041 .005 .064 .020 .037 .004 .027 .011 .066 .011
Political .203*** .042 .173*** .097** .182*** .105** .211*** .091** .131*** .155*** .272*** .134***
interest
Political −.027 −.042* −.041** −.005 −.048** −.04* −.048** −.018 −.073*** .045* −.048** −.007
ideology
Homogeneity −.082* .327*** .161*** .288*** .049*** .225*** .110** .233*** .174*** .271*** .079* .243***
of the people
Demand for .162*** .022 .206*** .063 .212*** .031 .19*** .018 .226*** −.077 .197*** .037
Sovereignty
Anti-Elite .230*** −.347*** .058 −.307*** .18*** −.308*** .078 −.317*** .080 −.226*** .057 −.318***
populism
Anti-outgroup −.080** −.129** −.082** −.104** −.023 −.063 −.068*** −.053 −.217*** −.073∗ −.118*** −.108**
populism
Adj. R2 .179*** .136*** .190*** .145*** .217*** .130*** .187*** .119*** .205*** .124*** .234*** .161***
Notes: Unstandardized b-values. 755 ≤ n ≤ 781; VIF < 2.05, Durbin-Watson-test: 1.83–2.10. * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
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